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Cert to CAS (Clark, Gee, Spears 
[DJ]) /2~~1 ~Cb,·--k­-,.,~~ 
~, .. -- - . 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: (1) Is Mississippi's maintenance of an 
all-woman state-supported university violative of a qualified 
male applicant's right to equal protection? (2) Did Congress 
exempt Mississippi University for Women from Title IX, 
Educational Amendments of 1972? 
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2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: The facts were not disputed. 
Mississippi University for Women (MUW), which offers a nursing 
program, among other courses of study, has admitted only women 
since it was established in 1884. Joe Hogan, a male, was 
rejected when he applied for admission to MUW's nursing program. 
But for his sex, he would have been admitted. Miss maintains two 
other, coeducational universities which offer degrees in nursing, 
but maintains no all-male university. Hogan sued for declaratory 
and monetary relief. 
The DC granted summary judgment in favor of MUW, holding 
that the maintenance of an institution of higher learning for 
females bore "a rational relationship to Mississippi's legitimate 
interest in providing the greatest practical range of educational 
opportunities for its female student population." The DC also 
found the single-sex admissions policy was not arbitrary since it 
was consistent with a respected, although controverted, attitude 
of some educators that benefits may accrue to students "who 
matriculate in a single-sex educational environment." 
~ 
The CA ) reversed. That ct relied upon this Court's judgment 
in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. ____ , 101 S.Ct. 1195 (1981), 
and required a showing that the gender-based classification was 
substantially related to an important governmental objective. 
The CA rejected the State's attempt to justify its maintenance of 
MUW by relying upon a statute [Miss.Code Ann. §37-117-3 (1972)] 
which states the purpose of establishing MUW was to provide 
"moral and intellectual advancement of the girls of the state 
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. as necessary or proper to fit them for the practical affairs of 
life." 1 
The CA noted that Mississippi was attempting to justify a 
gender-based classification with purposes that are also gender-
based. While the state has a substantial interest in providing a 
quality education for all its residents, that interest does not 
stop with female residents. The CA carefully limited its holding, 
stating only that the maintenance of MUW as the only state-
supported single-sex collegiate institution in the state was 
violative of equal protection rights. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Title IX of the Educational Amendments 
of 1972, 20 u.s.c. §1681, prohibits gender-based discrimination 
in undergraduate education. However, petr contends, this action 
is controlled by subsection {a) {5) of that statute, which 
specifically provides that Section 1681 shall not apply to any 
public undergraduate institution which has continually, from its 
establishment, admitted students of only one sex. Petr argues 
subsection {a) {5) was an exercise of Congress's enforcement power 
under section 5 of the 14 Amend. Resp answers that Congress 
specifically found that a sex-segregated system of education 
1The purpose of MUW is defined more specifically as educating 
the girls of the state "in the arts and sciences .•• normal 
school methods and kindergarten .•• bookkeeping, photography, 
stenography, telegraphy, and typewriting, and in designing, 
drawing, engraving, and painting, and their industrial 
application, and for their instruction in fancy, general and 
practical needlework •••. " 
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denies equal protection of the law and that, while Congress can 
indeed enforce the 14 Amend by virtue of its section 5 powers, it 
cannot, through that provision, allow states to maintain 
practices otherwise violative of the 14 Amend. 
Petr also contends that, given the state's purpose of 
providing for the moral and intellectual advancement of the girls 
of the state by maintaining a first-class institution for their 
education, maintenance of MUW is permissible under either the 
rational relationship or substantial relationship test. Resp 
contends that petr did not meet its burden of showing a 
substantial relationship related to an important governmental 
objective. The sole justification lay in the enabling 
legislation (quoted in part in Sec. 2, supra and in whole in 
Pet., at 8), which only demonstrates MUW's genesis in the kind of 
"archaic and overbroad" stereotypes which this Court has 
condemned. 
Pet further contends that a conflict exists between the 
decision below and that of the CA3 in Vorchheimer v. School 
District of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (CA3 1976), 
U.S. 703 (1977). In Vorchheimer, the CA3 upheld P 
430 
hia's 
practice of maintaining single-sex schools. That crt found that 
the city's practice of maintaining a limited number of secondary 
single-sex schools of equal quality did not offend the 14 Amend. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish that legitimate 
educational policies could be served by ~tilizing single-sex 
- s -
schools since some educators believe single-sex schools allow 
more effective studying. 
4. DISCUSSION: A distinction can be made between 
Vorchheimer and this action. Vorchheimer involved secondary 
schools; this action involves a university. Philadelphia 
maintained both all-male and all-female schools; Mississippi has 
no all-male university. However, if single-sex schools offend 
the 14 Amend. unless the classification is substantially related 
/ 
to an important governmental objective, CAS and CA3 are in 
conflict. In both decisions, the rationale advanced to justify 
the gender-based discrimination was the respected, although .. ··· 
controverted, theory that some students learn or study better in 
single-sex schools. CA3, relying upon that approach, found a 
I 
substantial relationship between single-sex schools and the 
legitimate state objective of providing quality education. 
in contrast, found that the only state interest involved was 
CAS, 
providing a quality education to a state's residents, despite the 
DC's conclusion that the decision to maintain a single-sex 
institution was consistent with a well-established body of 
opinion that benefits may accrue to students in such schools. 
The conflict is, therefore, real, since the legal issue does not 
depend upon whether single-sex schools are maintained for both 
sexes or for one. 
In addition; this action presents the question of whether 
Congress can declare whether a particular practice is allowed by 
the 14 Amend. ·_ By first finding that single-sex schools denied 
- 6 -
equal protection of the law and then deciding that such 
discrimination was permitted in a particular class of public 
schools, Congress apparently attempted to determine, through 
statute, what distinctions were permissible under the 14 Amend. 
The extent of congressional power in this area presents a 
substantial federal question. 
I recommend a grant. 
A response has been filed. 
October 14, 1981 McGregor opn in petn 
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Motion of Mississippi 
University for Women Alumnae 
Association for Leave to 
File a Brief as Amicus Curiae 
SUMMARY: Movant, an alumnae association of the petr, requests 
leave to file a timely amicus brief in support of the cert petn. 
1/ 
The petrs have consented to the filing.- Representing thousands 
of graduates and former students of the petr-University, the movants 
state that their purpose is to "preserve and promote the purposes 
of the [University] as an institution devoted to the exclusive 
higher education of women." Further, although movant was not a 
party in the litigation below, it has a distinct interest in the 
outcome because of the large number of women who have received,or 
will receive, their education at the University. 




DISCUSSION: Although the resp has to date not yet consented 
to this amicus brief, the movant has demonstrated an adequate 
interest to warrant its filing. 
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BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell March 21, 1982 
From: John Wiley 
Nos. 80-406: Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan 
Question Presented 
Can MUW constitutionally exclude men? 
Discussion 
In the abstract, this case presents a potentially dif-
ficult issue: whether the 14th Amendment prohibits a State, 
which operates a number of sexually integrated nursing schools, 
from adopting a sex-conscious admissions policy at one of them, 
"to eliminate [or] to compensate for past discrimination due to 
sex." Petr Br. 8. I find this abstract issue difficult for 
two reasons. First, it must evaluate "discriminatory" behavior 
-- the exclusion of men from all-women schools -- that is based 
upon the plausible educational theory that sexually segregated 
learning is beneficial to students. Highly respected educa-
tional institutions (e.g., Vassar, Radcliffe, Bryn Mawr) in the 
not-so-distant past adhered to women-only admissions policies. 
They did so for well informed and good faith educational rea-
sons. It is true that most such schools have abandoned the 
policy. But the recent history is a testimony to the legitima-
cy of the central pillar of Mississippi 1 s state interest in 
--------- - f 
lr 
this case: that an all-woman student body offers women other-
wise unattainable educational opportunities. 
/ 
The second reason that the case is difficult is that 
the remedial aspects of such educational affirmative action 
cannot be quickly dismissed. One reason affirmative action 
cases (like Bakke) are so difficult is the sympathy inspired by 
good faith effort to combat the often tragic legacies of past 
discrimination. consequently Mississippi 1 s general appeal to l 
affirmative action logic is entitled to serious consideration. 1 
1 I leave a third, potentially troublesome point off my list of 
reasons why this issue is difficult. That third point is the 
fact that Congress, when enacting Title IX, excepted college_ ad-
missions pOITCres for institutions "that traaitionally ~d con-
tinmTy !rom t€s establishment has had a pol1cy officadmi tting 
students Of onl one sex'r from tl'ie general T1 ITe IX an on sex 
discrimina 10n in education. 20 u.s.c. §168l(a) (5). Mississippi 
argues this exception means that Congress has authorized single 
sex colleges pursuant to the power granted by §5 of the 14th 
Amendment. It argues that the Court must defer to this congres-
sional judgment about the substantive content of the 14th Amend-
ment, citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 u.s. 641, 655-58 (1966). 
I disagree. Most importantly, I do not think that Title 
IX declare affirmative congressional policy favoring single sex 
colleges. Rather §l6Sl(a) (5) simply excludes single sex colleges 




The Court has little specific help from precedent mat-
ter on this subject. Twice the Court has affirmed sexual seg-
regation policies in public schools. See Williams v. McNair, 
316 F.Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971): 
Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (CA3 
1975). But Williams v. McNair preceded the Court's first sub-
stantive analysis of the problem of gender discrimination. See 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). I therefore think the McNair 
result is of little consequence to the problem at hand. And 
Vorchheimer, according to the CA3, involved no sex discrimina-
tion issue: Philadelphia ran Central High for boys and Girls 
from its remedial scheme, consisting of federal fund cutoffs and 
(since Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, at least!) private damage ac-
tions. Such an omission does showing Congress' reluctance to 
tangle with traditional single-sex colleges. It thus reinforces 
the point I made earlier about the very recent legitimacy of 
single-sex education. But the omission dos not amount to a sub-
stantive co~essional declaration of 14th Amendment rights. 
A second reason supports this same conclusion. Katzen-
bach does hold (in the alternative) that the Court must defer to 
congressional judgments about the substance of rights conveyed by 
the 14th Amendment. But Justice Brennan specifically stated 
there that "§5 grants no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" 
the guarantees of the 14th Amendment. 384 U.S. at 651 n.lO. 
Katzenbach thus only grants Congress the power to expand, not to 
subtract, 14th Amendment protections. Obviously resp Hogan's 
14th Amendment rights are not expanded by this Title XI omission. 
I conclude that Title IX's omission does not control or 
affect the analysis of whether MUW' s policy offends the 14th 
Amendment. That constitutional judgment is for the Court. It 
has not, and properly could not have been, made by Congress. But 
Congress' policy acknowledgement of the legitimacy of single-sex 
college education as a principle does, as a practical matter, 
make the abstract issue in this case more difficult -- for the 
same general reason as does Radcliffe's, etc., recent endorsement 
of single-sex education. 
4. 
High, which assertedly was of quality equal to that of Central. 
The case was affirmed, you recall, by an equally divided Court. 
Our file shows that you (joined by Justice Brennan, Marshall, 
and Stewart) believed that the two Philadelphia high schools in 
question in fact were not of equal quality. Therefore you 
would not have reached the question of whether segregation per 
se constituted sex discrimination. More importantly, 
Vorchheimer involved high schools rather than a college-level 
professional school, and there the state ran a segregated 
school for each sex. This case differs in both regards. I 
consequently believe that Vorchheimer also casts little light 
on the instant problem. 
Notwithstanding the confounding generalities that sur-
round the abstract issue in this case, I note that this issue 
is of narrow significance as a practical matter. According to 
our library research staff, there are only two other public 
----------------------~~ 
single-sex colleges in the nation: VMI and Texas College for 
~ -----' 
Women. 




much to simplify and narrow the decision that must be made in 
this case. Resp Hogan has shown that he has suffered a gender- 7 
based injury: but for his sex, he would be entitled to attend 
MU~eed, Mississippi freely concedes this point. Petr Br 
2It is important to separate the relevant from the irrelevant 
injury to Hogan. The relevant equal protection injury is that 
fact that Hogan could attend MUW -- except for the fact of his 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
4. 
Although sex is not a suspect category, it has re-
ceived heightened review. Consequently it seems to me that the 
burden of going forward with a showing that MUW' s policy is 
substantially related to important state interests must shift 
to Mississippi. (Mississippi fails to perceive this shift in 
the burden of going forward, confusing it instead with the bur-
den of persuasion -- which must always rests with the party 
attacking the constitutionality of a statute. See Petr Reply 
at 1.) I think Mississippi, by reason of a thin record, fails 
to substantiate its claim. Therefore I think the Court should 
find that MUW has failed adequately to defend its single-sex 
policy on these facts, and leave open the more general question 
of whether other state professinal schools (and certainly edu-
cational institutions, such as high schools, that deal with 
less mature students) could justify other, better supported 
sex-based admissions policies. / 
Mississippi cites commentary by three authors support-
ing the advantages of one-sex schools. (The three are Alexan-
der Astin, Elizabeth Tidball, and a group (to which MUW be-
gender. Hogan further complains that he will have to move, leave 
his job, sell his house, etc., to attend a Mississippi state 
nursing school other than MUW. This is true but immaterial. In-
dividuals have no right to attend university in the1r own home 
town. Happy coincidence locates MUW in Hogan's neighborhood. 




longs) called the Women's College Coalition. Petr Br at 12-
18.) As Hogan points out in rebuttal, Resp Br at 23-24, this 
commentary appears to be only the tip of the iceberg on this 
topic -- and a much-disputed tip as well. Because the matter 
of single-sex colleges can be a difficult issue in the ab-
stract, I think the Court should rely on the facts of the spe-
cific case to identify how well asserted state interests are 
served by the state policy in the particular case. Therefore --------the the general, abstract, and extra-record commentary on both 
sides of this issue should be discounted, I think. It seems to 
me that the Court should avoid couching this decision as a gen-
eral, quasi-legislative, judgment as to whether single-sex edu-
cation is good or bad policy in all instances. Rather the 
Court should stick to the record and pose the question as 
whether a particular act of gender-based discrimination is jus-
tified on the facts of the case. 
Record support for Mississippi's state interest ap- ? 
pears to be limited to a statement by MUW's president. See 
~------------------------------------------~ Reply at 2-3. In relevant part, this interest is Mississippi's 
belief that "the level of [women's] achievement in leadership 
is enhanced by the role models that are there at the 'W', by 
the environment of the classroom where women are totally en-
couraged to fulfill themselves in leadership as well as in aca-
demics." Id. at 2. 
Encouraging women's achievement in leadership and aca-
demics seems plainly to be an important state interest. The 
~----------------- - ~ 
7. 
key therefore is whether Mississippi's treatment of Hogan bears 
a substantial relationship to this interest. 
The facts of this case incline me to think that Mis-
sissippi fails to establish such a relationship. First, in 
this case there is reason to doubt the asserted academic and 
leadership benefits supposed to flow sexually segregated educa-
tion. I think it is quite plausible that there is less of the 
"mating game" (as amicus Alumae, at 3, color fully term it) on 
sexually segregated campuses and that therefore women students 
may concentrate on and achieve more in the way of academics and 
leardership. But Mississippi has no sexually segregated campus 
for men. This fact either belies Mississippi's claimed inter-
est or demonstrates that Mississippi believes that the "mating 
game" seriously distracts only female students. Either ground 
undermines Mississippi's case -- the former directly: the lat-
ter because it is the type of archaic and stereotyped reasoning 
that the Court previously has condemned. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 
U.S. 268, 283 (1979): Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 
(1976). 
I also doubt the veracity of Mississippi's affirmative 
action argument. MUW' s founding date (1844) and mandate (see 
Resp Br at 12-13) plainly had no remedial affirmative action 
intent. From the evidence, I see no documentation of a change 
in purpose. Rather, it appears that the school concentrates on 
traditional "female" s 'ects, such as nursing, secretarial and 
homemaker training. 3 
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
77 
8. 
There certainly is nothing wrong with such training. 
It is a fact that many, if not most, women still follow such 
paths. States appropriately can choose to provide such train-
ing for those who prefer it. But these are the fields in which 
women always have excelled. Therefore MUW brings its female 
students no affirmative academic or leadership training oppor-
tuni ties different from those previously available to them. 
Consequently, MUW's admissions policy looks more like the per-
petuation of outdated stereotypes than an authentic effort to 
help women break free of such stereotypes. 
This doubt is heightened by two additional facts. 
First, Mississippi adopted this affirmative action only after 
it had filed its cert petition in this Court. Mississippi did 
not raise the point in the DC or in the CAS. In fact, resp 
Hogan even argues that Mississippi should be precluded from 
making the argument, due to its lateness. While I do not agree 
with this view, I do believe Mississippi's timing illustrates 
the post hoc nature of its justification. 
Second, female role models, in the form of administra-
tion and senior faculty members, appear to be quite rare at 
3Mary Becker will be interested to learn from the MUW' s "con-
temporary Women" course series {which is "designed to prepare 
young women for the very active roles demanded of them in the 
Twentieth Century") that these roles consist of the following: ~ 
"Fashion, Introduction to Modeling, [Advanced] Modeling, and Per- b."'(/ 
sonal Development [which "presents various methods of self- /); /~~ 
improvement in appearance and • . . acceptable procedures in so- ~~ 





MUW. See Resp Br. 18-19 (citing MUW Bulletin). And Mississip-
pi offers no evidence that MUW has any higher proportion of 
women employees at any level as compared to its other, coeduca-
tional campuses. 
As a separate and final matter, there also is reason 
to doubt Mississippi's claim that the presence of men at MUW 
would lessen the quality of the educational experience for wom-
en. The best evidence of this is MUW Nursing School Acting 
Dean's testimony that the presence of men at MUW would have no 
adverse effect of the performance of female students. See Resp 
Br 21. Second-best evidence shows that resp Hogan apparently 
was "told that he could audit any courses that the chose but 
that he could not receive course credit." Amicus Brief, Nat'l 
Women's Law Center 30 n.l6 (no record citation provided). Male 
presence thus apparently in fact is not thought fatal by MUW. 
Similarly, MUW has permitted 138 other male course audits, and 
apparently has allowed them to participate in other campus ac-
tivities as well. (But 138 male audits over a 10 year period 
amounts to only a handful of men per year. If MUW is of any 
size at all, the number could well be de minimis.) 
On these facts, I therefore incline to affirm ce. I 
think, however, that any opinion should be written narrowly, as 
a fact-specific evaluation of the justification for and history 
of MUW's policy. This approach would leave it open for a fu-
ture state school (with more consistent affirmative action in-
terests) to make the case that sexual segregation is permissi-
10. 
ble. 
In my view, the holding also should be confined care-
fully to the university level. The state interest in educa-
tional sexual segregation could be quite different when stu-
dents are not adults. The Court therefore should not purport 
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JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§nprmu Clfttnrt llf f!rt ~b .§tafeg 
:.a.s'Jri:ttghm. ~. (!}. 21lbi'l-~ 
Apri 1 1 , 1982 I 
RE: No. 81-406 Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan 
Dear Chief: 
Sandra has agreed to take the opinion for the Court 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
• 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,ju.prnnt <!JMttt of tift ,-mua ,jtatts 
'Jfufrhtght~ ~. <!}. 2ll~'l~ 
April 2, 1982 
Re: No. 81-406 - Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan 
Dear Lewis: 
Will you take on a dissent in this case? 
Justice Powell 





April 5, 1982 
81-406 Misissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan 
Dear Chief: 
I will be glad to undertake a dissent in this 
case. 
The Chief ,Justice 
lfp/ss 





81-406 Mississippi University v. Hogan 
When I write my dissent I may find some help from 
the statement in my Rodriguez opinion 411 u.s. 1, at 50, to 
the effect that: 
"No area of social concern stands to profit 
more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and 
from a diversity of approach than does public 
education." 
L.F.P., ,Jr. 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: MAY " 7 1982 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
~ ~ l.A--' ~ 1st DRAFT 
l- \ \ 
~ ~ (: UPREME COl!RT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1"2.- ~--~'Noo8l-406 
_. ;~~9/-L-Vr~ , ~~ 
~~ J MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN, ET AL., PE-
J,A-V re:;} .J!;) TITIONERS vo JOE HOGAN 
-4 J-. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
~ APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
~ ~ ~-. 1982'['-- ~~~ 7 )Jw 
JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. ' 
~· 
~ ' 1 ~ This case presents the issue of whether a state statute that 
j _ _ 
0
, ~ excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported profes-
~~ /) ~ 
0 
~0 A sional nursing school violates the Equal Protection Clause of 0 
_ the Fourteenth Amendment. 
//.,~ - ~~ ,.,._-f' - ~~ t-t~.ttf!-4.A..£.,J '"' Jt:, 
v-z- P ~ v 1 - The fact;;re not in dispute. In 1884, the Mississippi leg-~ 
islature created the Mississippi Industrial Institute and Col- /2-. r-7)""" 
lege for the Education of White Girls of the State of Missis- ~
sippi, now the olde state-supported all-female college in the - {J 5'" /U... _ 
~ United States. 1884 iss. Gen. Laws, ch. XXX, §6. The 
school, known t as Mississippi University for Women ~
!} /1..-- ~ ~ (MUW), has from its inception limited its enrollment to _, _ _ 
0 
J 
women. 1 .....___. ~
/-& ~ ~~art" of MUW, b"-'ioaily unohanged ''"""its foundin:. Jf!.,<f - ? 
1 
_ Jt-:- _ _ 1 _ prov1des: ~ ().b.l ~ "1 5' ~~ "The purpose and aim of the Mississippi State College for Women is the 'r' 
~ moral and intellectual advancement of the girls of the state by the mainte- / tL--..t!!...tf1~ 
r .. v - - 0 - nance of a first-class institution for their edUCation in the arts and sciences, V"JA.:!" . ~ u - -
 for their training in normal school methods and kindergarten, for their in-~ -. 2--
,. ~ 1 _ . --:-) . , struction in bookkeeping, photography, stenography, telegraphy, and 
~~~ typewriting, and in designing, drawing, engraving, and painting, and their ~ 
industrial application, and for their instruction in fancy, general, and prac- J,., ~ ~7'"7 
tical needlework, and in such other industrial branches as experience, from r  ~ 
~~~~~of~~-1/5 
~.£/1.-- ~-ll:J 
~~s~~ ~~.r J 
t 
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In 1971, MUW established a School of Nursing, initially of-
fering a two-year associate degree. Three years later, the 
school instituted a four-year baccalaureate program in nurs-
ing and today also offers a graduate program. The School of 
Nursing has its own faculty and administrative officers and 
establishes its own criteria for admission. 2 
Respondent, Joe Hogan, is a registered nurse but does not 
hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing. Since 1974, he has 
worked as a nursing supervisor in a medical center in Colum-
bus, the city in which MUW is located. In 1979, Hogan ap-
plied for admission to the MUW School of Nursing's bacca-
laureate program. 3 Although he was otherwise qualified, he 
was denied admission to the School of Nursing solely because 
of his sex. School officials informed him that he could audit 
the courses in which he was interested, but could not enroll 
for credit. Tr. 26. 4 
Hogan filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Mississippi, claiming the single-
sex admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Hogan sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as 
compensatory damages. 
time to time, shall suggest as necessary or proper to fit them for the practi-
cal affairs of life." Miss. Code Ann. § 37-117-3 (1972). 
Mississippi maintains no other single-sex public universit or college. 
Thus, we are ~ faced with e ques 10n o w e er states can provide 
"se_parate but equal" undergraduate institutions for males and females. 
Cf. Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 532 F. 2d 880 (CA3 
1975), affd by an equally divided court, 430 U. S. 703 (1977). 
2 Record, Exhibit 1, 1980-1981 Bulletin of Mississippi University for 
Women 3, 32-34, 212-229. 
3 With a baccalaureate degree, Hogan would be able to earn a higher sal-
ary and would be eligible to obtain specialized training as an anesthetist. 
Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Tr.) 18. 
' Dr. James Strobel, President of MUW, verified that men could audit 
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Following a hearing, the District Court denied preliminary l\ 
injunctive relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. A4. The court con- D C 
eluded that maintenance of MUW as a single-sex school bears 
a rational refationslif to tlie staters l egitimate mterest "of 
prov1 mg tlie greatest prac 1ca range o e ucatwnal opportu-
nities for its female student population." ld., at A3. Fur-
thermore, the court stated, the admissions policy is not arbi-
trary because providing single-sex schools is consistent with 
a respected, though by no means universally accepted, edu-
cat1011aitheor that single-sex education affords unique bene-
fits to students. Ibid. Stating that t e case presentea no 
issue of fact;-- the court informed Hogan that it would enter 
summary judgment dismissing his claim unless he tendered a 
factual issue. When Hogan offered no further evidence, the 
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
State. Record 73. 
The Cou,rt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, hold- C IJ 6 
ing that, because the admissions policy discriminates on the ll? . _ _ _ I 
basis of gender, the District Court improperly used a "ratio-~
na~rel:illu.,nship" t~t to judge the constitutionality of the p ol- ....__.....-
icy. 646 F. 2d 1116, 1118. Instead, the Court of Appeals - ~ 
stated, the proper test is whether the State has carried the Jrl J ' . I 
heavier burden of showing that the gender-based classifica- .... 1 ~ ~
tion is substantially related to an important governmental ob- / _ ' . 
jective. ld., at 1118, 1119. Recognizing that the State has~
a significant interest in providing educational opportunities ~ /-_, ~ 
for all its citizens, the court then found that the State had 
---railed to show that prov1dmg a ~nique]ducational opportu-
nity for females, but not for rna es, bears a substantial rela-
tionship to that interest. !d., at 1119. Holding that the pol-
icy excluding Hogan because of his sex denies him equal 
protection of the laws, the court vacated the summary judg-
ment entered against Hogan as to his claim for monetary 
damages, and remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment 
in conformity with its opinion and for further appropriate 
proceedings. Id., at 1119-1120 . 
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On rehearing, the State contended that Congress, in enact-
ing § 901(a)(5) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. 92-:h s, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681 et seq., 
expressly had authorized MUW to continue its single-sex ad-
missions policy by exempting public undergraduate institu-
tions that traditionally have used single-s~ admissions poli-
cies from the gender discrimination prohibition of Title IX. 5 
Through that provision, the State argued, Congress limited 
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment by exercising its 
power under § 5 of the Amendment. 6 The Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument, holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not grant Congress power to authorize 
States to maintain practices otherwise violative of the 
Amendment. 653 F. 2d 223. 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. --, and now affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 7 
• Section 901(a) of Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-318, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a) (§ 1681), provides in part: 
"(a) No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance, except that: 
"(1) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall 
apply only to institutions of vocational education rofessional education, __....,..___ 
and graduate higher educat IOn, an o pu 1c institutions o undergra u-
ate higher education; 
"(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public 
institution of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that 
traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of ad-
mitting only students of one sex .... " 
6 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article." 
' Although the Court of Appeals' decision refers to all schools within 
MUW, see 646 F. 2d, at 1119, the factual underpinning of Hogan's claim for 
relief involved only his exclusion from the nursing program. Complaint 
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II ~ 
We begin our analysis aided by several firmly-established 1_,~. A .J~ 
principles. Because the challenged policy expressly dis- } ~~~ 
crimi t a on a licants o the basis of eiider,1ti88Ub- ~ 
ject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection lause of the  
Fourteenth Amendment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 75 
(1971). That this statute dis~mmates a~ainst males rather I 7 / 
than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or re-
duce the standard of review. 8 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 
U. S. 380, 394 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268, 279 (1979). 
Our decisions also establish that the party seeking to uphold 
a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gen-
der must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" for the classification. Kirchberg v. 
Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adminis-
trator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 273 (1979). 
The burden is met only by showing at least that the classifica-
tion serves "an i~ objective and that 
the discriminatory means employed" is "substantially related 
admission to the School of Nursing. Tr. of Oral Argument 24. Because 
Hogan's claim is thus limited, we decline to address the question of 
whether MUW's admissions policy, as applied to males seeking admission 
to schools other than the School of Nursing, violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
8 Without question, MUW's admissions policy worked to Hogan's disad-
vantag_e. Although Hogan could have attended classes and received credit 
in one of Mississippi's state-supported coeducational nursing programs, 
none of which was located in Columbus, he could attend only by driving a 
c~nsiderable distance from h1s nome. Tr. 19-'20, 63=65. A SlmUarTy Situ-
ated female would no~e b re uired to choose between foregoing 
credit and bearing tha inconvenience Moreover, since many students 
enrolled in t e c oo o ur n o a full-time jobs, Deposition of Dean 
Annette K. Barrar 29--30, ogan's female colleagues had available an 
opportunity, not open to gan, to obtain credit for additional training. 
The policy of denying male the right to obtain credit toward a baccalaure-
ate degree thus imposed pon Hogan "a burden he would not bear were he 
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to the achievement of those objectives." Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U. S. 142, 150 (1977). 9 
Although the test £ errm · validity of a gender-
based classification i strai htforward · must be applied free 
f fixed notions conce · s and abilities of males and 
females. "'Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the 
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic n..o-
tions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "pro-
tect1' members of one gender because they are presumed to 
suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, 
the objective itself is illegitimate. See Frontwro v. Richard-
son, 411 U. S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). 10 
9 Because we conclude that the challenged statutory classification is not 
substantially related to an impoi'tanf obJective, we need not dec1ae 
whether classifications based upon gend er are inherently suspect. See 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 13 (1975). 
10 History provides numerous examples of legislative attempts to exclude 
women from particular areas simply because legislators believed women 
were less able than men to perform a particular function. In 1872, this 
Court remained unmoved by Myra Bradwell's argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibited a State from classifying her as unfit to prac-
tice law simply because she was female. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 
(1872). In his concurring opinion, Justice Bradley described the reasons 
underlying the State's decision to determine which positions only men 
could fill: 
"It is the prerogative of the legislator to prescribe regulations founded on 
nature, reason, and experience for the due admission of qualified persons 
to professions and callings demanding special skill and confidence. This 
fairly belongs to the police power of the State; and, in my opinion, in view 
of the peculiar characteristics, destiny, and mission of woman, it is within 
the province of the legislature to ordain what offices, positions, and callings 
shall be filled and discharged by men, and shall receive the benefit of those 
energies and responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are pre-
sumed to predominate in the sterner sex." ld., at 142. 
In a similar vein, the Court in Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464, 466 
(1948), upheld a legislature's right to preclude women from bartending, ex-
cept under limited circumstances, on the ground that the legislature could 
devise preventive measures against "moral and social problems" that result 
81-40~0PINION 
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If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we 
next determine whether the requisite direct, substantial rela-
tionsh~en objective and means is present. The pur-
pose of reqmring that close relationship iS to assure that the 
validity of a classification is determined through reasoned 
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of ~ 
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper 
roles of men and women. 11 The need for the requirement is 
amply revealed by reference to the broad range of statutes 
already invalidated by this Court, statutes that relied upon 
the simplistic, outdated assum.I?tion that genper could be 
used as a "proxy for other, more germane bases of classifica-
tions," Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 198 (1976), to establish 
a link between objective and classification. 12 
when women, but apparently not men, bartend. Similarly, the many pro-
tective labor .laws enacted in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries often had as their objective the protection of weaker workers, which 
the laws assumed meant females. See generally, B. Brown, A. Freed-
man, H. Katz, & A. Price, Women's Rights and the Law 209-210 (1977). 
11 For instance, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979), we invali-
dated a state statute that required the consent of an unmarried mother, 
but not of an unmarried father, to the adoption of a child born out of wed-
lock. We agreed that a State's interest in providing adoptive homes for 
illegitimate children is important. On analysis, however, we determined 
that the purported relationship between that objective and the gender-
based classification was based upon traditional assumptions about maternal 
and paternal roles. Id., 391-392. Once those traditional notions were 
abandoned, no basis for finding a substantial relationship between classifi-
cation and objective remained. 
'
2 See, e. g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (statute granted 
only husbands the right to manage and dispose of jointly owned property 
without the spouse's consent); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance 
Co., 446 U. S. 142 (1980) (statute required a widower, but not a widow, to 
show he was incapacitated from earning to recover benefits for a spouse's ____,--
death under workers' compensation laws); Orr v. Orr, supra (~ 
men could be ordered to pay alimony following divorce); Craig v. Boren, 
429 U. S. 190 (1976) (women could purchase "nonintoxicating'' beer at a 
younger age than could men); Stanton v. Stanton, supra, (women reached 
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Applying this framework, we now analyze the arguments 
advanced by the State to justify its refusal to allow males to 
enroll for credit in MUW's School of Nursing. 
III 
A 
The State's primary justification for maintaining the sin-
gle-sex admissions policy of MUW's School of Nursing is that 
it compensates for discrimination against women and, there-
fore, constitutes educational affirmative action. Pet. Brief 
8. 13 As applied to the School of Nursing, we find the State's 
argument unpersuasive. 
majority at an earlier age than did men); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U. S. 636 (1975) (widows, but not widowers, could collect survivors' bene-
fits under the Social Security Act); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 
(1973) (determination of spouse's dependency based upon gender of mem-
ber of armed.forces claiming dependency benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 
71 (1971) (statute preferred men to women as administrators of estates). 
13 In its Reply Brief, the State understandably retreated from its conten-
tion that MUW was foundea to provide opportunities for women which 
were not available to men. Reply Brief 4. Apparently, the impetus for 
founding MUW came not from a aesire to provide women with advantages 
superior to those offered men, but rather from a desire to provide white 
women in Mississippi access to state-supported higher learning. In 1856, 
Sally Reneau began agitating for a college for white women. Those initial 
efforts were unsuccessful, and, by 1870, Mississippi provided higher educa-
tion only for white men and black men andWO"men. 1;;. 1\1ayes, History of 
Educa wn m ississ1pp1 1 , 2 8, 2 , , 70 (1899) (hereinafter Mayes). 
See also S. Nielson, The History of Mississippi State College for Women 
4-5 (unpublished manuscript, 1952) (hereinafter Nielson). In 1882, two 
years before MUW was chartered, the University of Mississippi opened its 
doors to women. However, the institution was in those early years not 
"extensively patronized by females; most of those who come being such as 
desire to qualify themselves to teach." Mayes, at 178. By 1890, the larg-
est number of women in any class at the University had been 23, while 
nearly 350 women enrolled in the first session of MUW. Mayes, at 178, 
253. Because the University did not solicit the attendance of women until 
after 1920, and did not accept women at all for a time between 1907 and 
1920, most Mississippi women who attended college attended MUW. 
81-406-0PINION 
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In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification fa-
voring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly 
assists members of the sex that is disproportionately bur-
dened. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974). How-
ever, we consistently have emphasized that "the mere recita- \ 
tion of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic 
shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual pur-
poses underlying a statutory scheme." Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648 (1975). The same searching 
analysis must be made, regardless of whether the State's ob-
jective is to eliminate family controversy, Reed v. Reed, 
supra, to achieve administrative efficiency, Frontiero v. 
Richardson, supra, or to balance the burdens borne by males 
and females. 
1 
It is readily apparent that a State can evoke a compensa- ~ ( 
tory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classifica- · 
tion ~if members of the gen?er be!lefited by the classifica-
tion actually suffer a · disadvantage related to the 
classification. W-e considered such a situation in Kahn v. 
Shevin, supra, which involved a challenge to a state statute 
providing widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemp-
tion. Noting that there could be "no dispute that the finan-
cial difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in 
any other State exceed those facing the man" and that "the 
job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the 
lowest paid jobs," id., at 353, we upheld the taxing scheme as 
furthering the objective of reducing the disparity between 
the economic capabilities of men and women. See also Cal-
ifano v. Webster, 430 U. S. 313, 318 (1977) (holding valid a 
Nielson, at 86. Thus, in Mississippi, as elsewhere in the country, women's 
colleges were founded to provide some form of higher education for the aca-
demically disenfranchised. See generally II T. Woody, A History of 
Women's Education in the United States 137-223 (1966); L. Baker, I'm 
Radcliffe! Fly Me! The Seven Sisters and the Failure of Women's Edu-
cation 22, 13~141 (1976). 
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statutory classification that allowed women higher monthly 
Social Security benefits than men with the same earning his-
tory because the statute took into account that women "as 
such have been unfairly hindered from earning as much as 
men" and "work[ed] directly to remedy" the resulting eco-
nomic disparit 
A simila pattern of discrimination ainst women influ-
enced our 1s1on m c e . S. 498 
(1975). There, w ns1 ered a federal statute that granted 
female Naval officers a 13-year tenure of commissioned serv-
ice before mandatory discharge, but accorded male officers 
only a 9-year tenure. We recognized that, because women 
were barred from combat duty, they had had fewer opportu-
nities for promotion than had their male counterparts. By 
allowing women an additional four years to reach a particular 
rank before subjecting them to mandatory discharge, the 
statute directly compensated for other statutory barriers to 
advancement. 
I:Q sharp contrast, Mississippi has made no showing that 
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of 
nursing or toattam positwns of leaClership in that field when 
the MUW School of Nur-sing opened its door or that women 
currently are .deprived of such opportunities. In fact, in 
1970, the year before the School of Nursing's first class en-
rolled, women earn'ed 94 percent of the nursing baccalaureate 
degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the de-
l 
grees earned nationwide.' United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Earned Degrees Conferred: 
1969-70, 388. That year was not an aberration; one decade 
earlier, women had earned all the nursing degrees conferred 
in Mississippi and 98.9 percent of the degrees conferred na-
tionwide. United States Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, Earned Degrees Conferred 1959-1960: Bache-
lor's and Higher Degrees 135. As one would expect, the 
labor force reflects the same predominance of women in nurs-
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nearly 98 percent of all employed registered nurses were fe-
male. 14 United States Bureau of the Census, 1981 Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 402 (1981). 
Rather than compensate for discriminatory barriers faced 
by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from · · 
to the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the tereot pe 
view of nursing as an exclusive y woman s o . 15 • g 
tha ISSISSippi al ots more openmgs in its state-supported 
nursing schools to women than it does to men, MUW's admis-
sions policy lends credibility to the old view that women, not 
men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that 
nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophecy. See 
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7 (1975). Thus, we conclude 
that, although the State recited a "benign, compensatory 
purpose," it failed to establish that the alleged objective is 
the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory 
classification. 16 
" Relatively little change has taken place during the past 10 years. In 
1980, women received more than 94 percent of the baccalaureate degrees 
conferred nationwide, National Center for Education Statistics, 1981 Di-
gest of Education Statistics 121, and constituted 96.5 percent of the regis-
tered nurses in the labor force . United States Bureau of the Census, 1981 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 402. 
'
5 0fficials of the American Nurses Association have suggested that ex-
cluding men from the field has depressed nurses' wages. Hearings Before 
the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on Job 
Segregation and Wage Discrimination 510-511, 517-518, 523 (April1980). 
To the extent the exclusion of men has that effect, MUW's admissions pol-
icy actually penalizes the very class the State purports to benefit. Cf. 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra. 
16 Even were we to assume that discrimination against women affects 
their opportunity to obtain an education or to obtain leadership roles in 
nursing, the challenged policy nonetheless would be invalid, for the State 
has failed to establish that the legislature intended the single-sex policy to 
compensate for any perceived discrimination. Cf. Califano v. Webster, 
430 U. S. 313, 318 (1977) (legislative history of the compensatory statute 
revealed that Congress "deliberately addressed the justification for differ-
ing treatment of men and women" and "purposely enacted the more favor-
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The policy is invalid also because it fails the second part of 
the equal protection test, for the State has made no shoWing 
that the gender-ba'Smr classification is substantially and di-
rectly related to its proposed compensatory objective. To 
the contrary, MUW's policy of permitting men to attend 
classes as auditors fatally undermines its claim that women, 
at least those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected 
by the presence of men. 
MUW permits men who audit to participate fully in 
classes. Additionally, both men and women take part in con-
tinuing education courses offered by the School of Nursing, in 
which regular nursing students also can enroll. Deposition 
of Dr. James Strobel 5(H)0 and Deposition of Dean Annette 
K. Barrar 24-26. The uncontroverted record reveals that 
admitting men to nursing classes does not affect teaching 
style, Deposition of Nancy L. Herban 4, that the presence of 
men in the classroom would not affect the performance of the 
female nursing students, Tr. 61 and Deposition of Dean An-
nette K. Barrar 7-8, and that men in coeducational nursing 
schools do not dominate the classroom. Deposition of Nancy 
Herban 6. In sum, the record in this case is flatly inconsis-
tent with the claim that excluding men from the School of 
Nursing is necessary to reach any of MUW's educational 
goals. 
Thus, considering both the asserteu interest and the rela-
tionship between the interest and the methods used by the 
State, we conclude that the State has fallen far short of estab-
lishing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" needed to 
able treatment for female wage earners .... ") The State has provided no 
evidence whatever that the Mississippi legislature has ever attempted to 
justify its differing treatment of men and women seeking nurses' training. 
Indeed, the only statement of legislative purpose is that in § 37-118--3 of 
the Mississippi Code, see note 1, supra, a statement that relies upon the 
very sort of archaic and overbroad generalizations about women that we 
have found insufficient to justify a gender-based classification. E. g., Orr 
v. Orr, supra; Stanton v. Stanton, supra. 
81-406-0PINION 
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sustain the gender-based classification. Accordingly, we 
hold that MUW's policy of denying males the right to enroll 
for credit in its School of Nursing violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B 
In an additional attempt to justify its exclusion of men from 
MUW's School of Nursing, the State contends that MUW is 
the direct beneficiary "of specific congressional legislation 
which, on its face, permits the institution to exist as it has in 
the past." Pet. Brief 19. The argument is based upon the 
language of§ 901(a) in Title IX of the Education Amendments 
of 1972, 20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). Although § 901(a) prohibits 
gender discrimination in education programs that receive 
federal financial assistance, subsection 5 exempts the admis-
sions policies of undergraduate institutions "that traditionally 
and continually from [their] establishment [have] had a policy 
of admitting only students of one sex" from the general prohi-
bition. See note 5, supra. Arguing that Congress enacted 
Title IX in furtherance of its power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a power granted by § 5 of that Amendment, the 
State would have us conclude that § 1681(a)(5) is but "a con-
gressional limitation upon the broad prohibitions of the Equal 
Protection ( lause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Pet. 
Brief 20. 
The argument requires little comment. Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power indeed 
to enforce the command of the Amendment and "to secure to 
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights 
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or 
invasion .... " Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346 (1879). 
Congress' power under § 5, however, "is limited to adopting 
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute 
these guarantees." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 
651 n. 10 (1966). Although we give deference to congres-
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sional decisions and classifications, neither Congress nor a ~ 
State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Califano v. 
Goldfarb, supra, at 210; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 
(1968). 
The fact that the language of § 901(a)(5) applies to MUW 
provides the State no solace: "[A] statute apparently govern-
ing a dispute cannot be applied by judges, consistently with 
their obligations, when such an appl~tion o.f_the statute 
would confli~h the Constitution. arbury v. Mad is on, 
1 Cranch 137 (1803)." Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 52 
(1971). 
IV 
Because we conclude that the State's policy of excluding 
males from MUW's School of Nursing violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is so ordered. 
May 28, 1982 
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June 7, 1982 
MS GINA-POW 
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 
81-406 MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN v. HOGAN 
Having read Just ice 0 1 Connor 1 s opinion, and reread 
the briefs, I dictate these unorganized comments. 
The striking thing about the Court opinion is that it 
is written as if this were the typical sex discrimination 
case. The familiar language is repeated frequently. ___ The 
label "stereotype" appears more than once, heretofore used 
- I believe - only with respect to discrimination against 
women.* There is no history of discrimination against 
men. No ERA for men has been proposed. 
*See WJB 1 s opinion in Fronterio v. Richardson. 
In the second sentence of the analysis section, (Part 
II, p. 5), the opinion states as a fact that "the 
challenged policy expressly discriminates against 
applicants on the basis of gender". Note the word 
"policy". There are eight state institutions of higher 
learning. Only this one has a unisex "policy". It is 
evident that the state has no such general policy. 
Although I have not verified my recollection, I believe 
that the only reference in the Court opinion to the 
availability of other state universities or colleges is 
one sentence inn. 1, p. 2. In the same paragraph, the 
opinion states: 
"We are not faced with the question of whether 
states can provide 'separate but equal' 
undergraduate education", citing Vorchheimer. 
Nor indeed "are we faced" with any situation of 
"separate but equal" as to college in the sense in which 
that phrase always has been used. 
The sex discrimination cases in the past, including 
those relied upon by the Court, all involved 
quitedifferent situations. They concerned classifications 
of uniform and general application either to an entire 




one of the few cases involving discrimination against men 
- a state-wide statute was involved. In Oklahoma a man 
could not go anywhere for beer if he was under age. 
Similarly, classifications that provided different 
benefits for women, afforded them no opportunity for that 
provided for men. This was true, for example, in 
Frontiero v. Richardson (armed services benefit~); 
Schleisinger v. Ballard (also armed services benefits); 
Wineberger v. Wisenfeld (social security surviver 
benefits), Califano v. Goldfarb (old age widows' and 
widowers' surviver benefits); Stanton v. Stanton 
(arbitrary age differences between the sexes with respect 
to parental support for children) ; and other similar 
cases. Here, men have a choice as do the women who chose 
MWU.* 
*As men have no choice of a an all male college, a man 
claiming discriminaiton would have a different case. 
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There is no prior sex discrimination decision by this 
Court in which the plaintiff, as in this case, had a 
choice of an equal benefit. In the armed services cases, 
the women were given no opportunity for the same benefits 
as men. Similarly, in the social security cases, there 
was no choice. In Boren, a male under twenty-one could 
not buy a can of beer anywhere in the state. 
Nor do I view the "options" available to Hogan in 
this case as comparable to the "separate but equal" 
classifications condemned in Brown.** These also were 
across the board bans, certainly in all pre-college 
education in the South. They also were across the board 
bans in higher education until some states provided 
options in an effort to circumvent decisions of this 
Court. In a more fundamental sense, the racial 
classifications were examples of invidious discrimination. 
In view of the foregoing, I am presently inclined to 
write an opinion arguing that this as not a sex 
discrimination within the jurisprudence of this Court. In 
only one out of a number of institutions of higher 
education, this state wishes to continue to maintain one 
all female college that is almost a hundred years old. At 
** Justice O'Connor agrees this is not a "separate but 
equal" case. See n. 1, p. 1 
Jo 
the same time, the state provides for men and women alike 
a complete and unrestricted choice of a number of other 
co-edinstitutions. No claim is made that the education 
offered at MUW is inferior to that available elsewhere, or 
that the education available elsewhere is inferior to that 
available at MUW. There is no history of discrimination 
against men in Mississippi. No claim of discriminatory 
intent. No claim of any injury whatever except 
inconvenience. The stereotype talk is nonsense. 
Hogan did not aver that he wants the benefit of co-
education. Nor does his complaint aver that coeducation 
in general is preferable to a unisex education. In a 
word, this is a different case from any previously 
presented. The conventional sex discrimination analysis -
embraced without addressing any of the foregoing 
differences - simply does not fit. 
***** 
A second, perhaps easier - but less appealing to me -
way to write a dissent is to look only to the facts and 
averments of this particular case. This is not a class 
action. As indicated above, none of the classical reasons 
v. 
for treating state action as sex discrimination exists in 
this case. I suppose, it could be written as a suit in 
which a single male, solely because of personal 
convenience, wishes to go to college in his home town. If 
this were a legitimate reason for finding discrimination, 
it would have to be based on a geographic analysis. In 
Virginia - until recent years - a person living in the 
far southwest of the state, who desired the advantages of 
a liberal arts education would have to attend the 
University of Virginia - located perhaps 250 miles away, 
with no trains service. The inconvenience would be 
substantial. Such a person could claim that he was 
discriminated against as contrasted with a person living 
in Charlottesville, who could walk to the University. 
***** 
Whether I dissent broadly (as I am inclined to do), 
or focus only on the narrow facts of this case, the 
opinion will have to be reasoned on equal protection 
analysis. I would start with emphasis on the unique 
nature of the "classification". If it can be so 
I • 
characterized in equal protection terms. Normally - as 
stated above - a challenged classification is general or 
across the board terms. The college has a long history, 
with thousands of alumnae with loyalty to it as a women's 
college. (See brief of Alumnae Association). It is well-
at tended, is open to women of all races, and those who 
attend it do so soley as a matter of personal choice. 
There are abundant other opportunities for coeducation. 
But even applying "stereotype" equal protection 
anaylsis, the continued maintenance of this single unisex 
college does further a substantial state interest and is 
reasonably related to it. I could apply the same standard 
articulated in Reed v. Reed and Boren. Contrary to the 
emphasis in petitioner's briefs, the primary justification 
for continuing MUW is the desire of the state to preserve 
a choice for women. If there is a denial of equal 
protection in Mississippi education, it is that no 
comparable choice is provided for men. 
To argue that no substantial state interest is being 
served, is to condemn the educational judgment - that for 
most of the history of this country - has justified the 
great womens colleges. Most of them - genuflecting to 
fashion and, in fairness, to the good arguments that can 
o. 
be made for coeducation - now have abandoned the all 
womens concept that served them so well for so long. But 
this does not negate the existence of a substantial state 
interest. This is evidenced - in part, at least - by the 
fact that a number of private, quality all womens 
colleges still exist and are well patronized. Faculty 
members who serve in these colleges, the women who choose 
to attend them, and the donors who provide endowment are 
hardly irrational people. They believe with an 
abundence of history to support them - that at least for 
some women, an all womens college affords opportunities 
and advantages that are preferable to coeducational 
colleges. The only testimony in this case on this issue 
is that an all womens college does present opportuni tes 
and advantages that are not available in coed 
institutions. In my view, the long experience with 
education in womens colleges -- viewed as educationally 
desirable supports the existence of a legitimate state 
interest. Perhaps I should add as a footnote that I have 
experienced it personally with a wife and three daughters. 
At a broader level of discourse, we can rely on the 
worth and tradition of diversity that has marked the 
history of our country. One of the unfortunate aspects of 
~. 
modern society is a tendency to discourage experimentation 
and diversity. 
The Court, in this case, may have departed farther 
from the intent and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
than in any prior case. 
L.F.P. 
June 7, 1982 
MS GINA-POW 
MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 
81-406 MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN v. HOGAN 
Having read Justice O'Connor's opinion, and reread 
the briefs, I dictate these unorganized comments. 
The striking thing about the Court opinion is that it 
is written as if this were the typical sex discrimination 
case. The familiar language is repeated frequently. __ The 
label "stereotype" appears more than once, heretofore used 
- I believe - only with respect to discrimination against 
women.* There is no history of discrimination against 
men. No ERA for men has been proposed. 
*See WJB's opinion in Fronterio v. Richardson. 
2 . 
In the second sentence of the analysis section, (Part 
II, p. 5), the opinion states as a fact that "the 
challenged policy expressly discriminates against 
applicants on the basis of gender". Note the word 
"policy". There are eight state institutions of higher 
learning. Only this one has a unisex "pol icy". It is 
evident that the state has no such general policy. 
Although I have not verified my recollection, I believe 
that the only reference in the Court opinion to the 
availability of other state universities or colleges is 
one sentence in n. 1, p. 2. In the same paragraph, the 
opinion states: 
"We are not faced with the question of whether 
states can provide 'separate but equal' 
undergraduate education", citing Vorchheimer. 
Nor indeed "are we faced" with any situation of 
"separate but equal" as to college in the sense in which 
that phrase always has been used. 
The sex discrimination cases in the past, including 
those relied upon by the Court, all involved 
quitedifferent situations. They concerned classifications 
of uniform and general application either to an entire 
state or the nation. In Craig v. Boren, for example, 
3. 
one of the few cases involving discrimination against men 
- a state-wide statute was involved. In Oklahoma a man 
could not go anywhere for beer if he was under age. 
Similarly, classifications that provided different 
benefits for women, afforded them no opportunity for that 
provided for men. This was true, for example, in 
Frontiero v. Richardson (armed services benefit~); 
Schleis inger v. Ballard (also armed services benefits) ; 
Wineberger v. Wisenfeld (social security surviver 
benefits), Califano v. Goldfarb (old age widows' and 
widowers' surviver benefits); Stanton v. Stanton 
(arbitrary age differences between the sexes with respect 
to parental support for children); and other similar 
cases. Here, men have a choice as do the women who chose 
MWU.* 
*As men have no choice of a an all male college, a man 
claiming discriminaiton would have a different case. 
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There is no prior sex discrimination decision by this 
Court in which the plaintiff, as in this case, had a 
choice of an equal benefit. In the armed services cases, 
the women were given no opportunity for the same benefits 
as men. Similarly, in the social security cases, there 
was no choice. In Boren, a male under twenty-one could 
not buy a can of beer anywhere in the state. 
Nor do I view the "options" available to Hogan in 
this case as comparable to the "separate but equal" 
classifications condemned in Brown.** These also were 
across the board bans, certainly in all pre-college 
education in the South. They also were across the board 
bans in higher education until some states provided 
options in an effort to circumvent decisions of this 
Court. In a more fundamental sense, the racial 
classifications were examples of invidious discrimination. 
In view of the foregoing, I am presently inclined to 
write an opinion arguing that this as not a sex 
discrimination within the jurisprudence of thi~ · court. In 
only one out of a number of institutions of higher 
education, this state wishes to continue to maintain one 
all female college that is almost a hundred years old. At 
** Justice 0 'Connor agrees this 
equal" case. See n. 1, p. 1 
is not a "separate but 
5. 
the same time, the state provides for men and women alike 
a complete and unrestricted choice of a number of other 
co-edinstitutions. No claim is made that the education 
offered at MUW is inferior to that available elsewhere, or 
that the education available elsewhere is inferior to that 
available at MUW. There is no history of discrimination 
against men in Mississippi. No claim of discriminatory 
intent. No claim of any injury whatever except 
inconvenience. The stereotype talk is nonsense. 
Hogan did not aver that he wants the benefit of co-
education. Nor does his complaint aver that coeducation 
in general is preferable to a unisex education. In a 
word, this is a different case from any previously 
presented. The conventional sex discrimination analysis -
embraced without addressing any of the foregoing 
differences - simply does not fit. 
***** 
A second, perhaps easier - but less appeal·ing to me -
way to write a dissent is to look only to the facts and 
averments of this particular case. This is not a class 
action. As indicated above, none of the classical reasons 
1 
6. 
for treating state action as sex discrimination exists in 
this case. I suppose, it could be written as a suit in 
which a single male, solely because of personal 
convenience, wishes to go to college in his home town. If 
this were a legitimate reason for finding discrimination, 
it would have to be based on a geographic analysis. In 
Virginia - until recent years - a person living in the 
far southwest of the state, who desired the advantages of 
a liberal arts education would have to attend the 
University of Virginia - located perhaps 250 miles away, 
with no trains service. The inconvenience would be 
substantial. Such a person could claim that he was 
discriminated against as contrasted with a person living 
in Charlottesville, who could walk to the University. 
***** 
Whether I dissent broadly (as I am inclined to do), 
or focus only on the narrow facts of this '- case, the 
opinion will have to be reasoned on equal protection 
analysis. I would start with emphasis on the unique 
nature of the "classification". If it can be so 
~ 
7. 
characterized in equal protection terms. Normally - as 
stated above - a challenged classification is general or 
across the board terms. The college has a long history, 
with thousands of alumnae with loyalty to it as a women's 
college. (See brief of Alumnae Association). It is well-
at tended, is open to women of all races, and those who 
attend it do so soley as a matter of personal choi~e. 
There are abundant other opportunities for coeducation. 
But even applying "stereotype" equal protection 
anaylsis, the continued maintenance of this single unisex 
college does further a substantial state interest and is 
reasonably related to it. I could apply the same standard 
articulated in Reed v. Reed and Boren. Contrary to the 
emphasis in petitioner's briefs, the primary justification 
for continuing MUW is the desire of the state to preserve 
a choice for women. If there is a denial of equal 
protection in Mississippi education, it is that no 
comparable choice is provided for men. 
To argue that no substantial state interest is being 
served, is to condemn the educational judgment' -- that for 
most of the history of this country - has justified the 
great womens colleges. Most of them - genuflecting to 
fashion and, in fairness, to the good arguments that can 
8. 
be made for coeducation now have abandoned the all 
womens concept that served them so well for so long. But 
this does not negate the existence of a substantial state 
interest. This is evidenced - in part, at least - by the 
fact that a number of private, quality all womens 
colleges still exist and are well patronized. Faculty 
members who serve in these colleges, the women who choose 
"' 
to attend them, and the donors who provide endowment are 
hardly irration?l people. They believe with an 
abundence of history to support them - that at least for 
some women, an all womens college affords opportunities 
and advantages that are preferable to coeducational 
colleges. The only testimony in this case on this issue 
is that an all womens college does present opportuni tes 
and advantages that · are not available in coed 
institutions. In my view, the long experience with 
education in womens colleges -- viewed as educationally 
desirable supports the existence of a legitimate state 
interest. Perhaps I should add as a footnote that I have 
experienced it personally with a wife and thre~ daughters. 
At a broader level of discourse, we can rely on the 
worth and tradition of diversity that bas marked the 
history of our country. One of the unfortunate aspects of 
; 9. 
modern society is a tendency to discourage experimentation 
and diversity. 
The Court, in this case, may have departed farther 
from the intent and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
than in any prior case. 
L.F.P. 
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Re: 81-406 - Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan 
Dear Sandra: 




Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, p. 1 (MUV) 
MUWl SALLY-POW 
The Court's opinion genuflects deeply to 
conformity at the expense of the diversity that has 
characterized - and enriched - so much of American life. 
It holds that no state now may provide a single 
institution of higher learning open only to women 
students. No matter that the State of Mississippi 
provides abundant opportunities for young men and young 
women to attend coeducational institutions, and no matter 
that more than 2,000 young women have evidenced their 
approval of an all-women's college by voluntarily choosing 
Mississippi University for Women (MUW) over seven other 
coed universities available within the state. Today, the 
Court today decides that the equal protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes it unlawful for women to have 
this choice. It makes this decision in a case instituted 
by one young man, representing no class, whose primary 
concern was avoiding the inconvenience of traveling some 
distance to the nearest coed college. 
2. 
It is undisputed that women enjoy complete 
equality of opportunity in the Mississippi public higher 
education system, composed of eight universities and 16 
junior colleges. All of these except MUW is 
coeducational. Respondent wishes to study nursing, and at 
least two other Mississippi universities would have made 
this available for him. 1 Respondent alone complains. 
Indeed, only MUW female students - and alumni of MUW -
have filed amici briefs, and these emphatically reject 
respondent's claim, and urge that the State of Mississippi 
be allowed to continue offering this choice. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, p. 4 (MUW) 
MUW4 SALLY-POW 
John: I don't want to omit our Virginia schools, and so 
add a footnote at the point indicated on page 4 as 
follows: 
"The history, briefly summarized above, of 
single-sex higher education in the Northeast is duplicated 
in other states. I mention only my State of Virginia 
where even today Hollins College, Mary Baldwin College, 
Randolph Macon Woman's College and Sweet Briar College 
remain all women's, and each has a proud and respected 
reputation." 
'. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, p. 5 {MUW) 
MUWS SALLY-POW 
Add a footnote as follows: 
"Until the traditional all-men's universities in 
the East became coeducational, it is true that women 
preferring that type of educational evironment may have 
had fewer choices of first-rate coeducational institutions 
- although for many years there were numerous options 
available." 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider (MUW) 
MUWR SALLY-POW 
John: In the discussion of the traditional quality 
women's colleges, we can head off a reply by Justice 
O'Connor by adding a note along the following lines: 
"To be sure, the women's colleges referred to 
herein are not state institutions. Also, it is true that 
until the middle of this century many sate institutions of 
higher education - particularly in the East and South -
were single sex. To these extents, choices were by no 
means universally available to all men and women. But 
choices always were substantial, and the purpose of 
relating the experience of our country with single sex 
colleges and universities is to document what should be 
obvious: generations of Americans, including scholars, 
have thought - wholly without regard to sex 
'discrimination' - that there were distinct advantages in 
this type of higher educat' 
impression that this is 
2. 
of our history, 
pattern of 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, p. 12 (MUW) 
MUW12 SALLY-POW 
III 
As I view this case as far removed from the line 
of sex discrimination cases referred to above, I would 
sustain Mississippi's right to continue MUW on straight 
rational basis analysis. But I need not apply this 
"lowest tier" of scrutiny. The Court I can accept - for 
present purposes - the standard applied by the Court: 
that this gender based distinction must serve an important 
governmental objective by means that are substantially 
related to its achievement. ~.,Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Ins. Co., 446 u.s. 142, 150 (1980). As is clear 
from the record in this case, because of its historic 
position in the state dating back to 1884, and the 
continuing desire of many young women in Mississippi to 
attend MUW, this college has been continued to preserve a 
choice. As made clear above, it is a choice that 
discriminates against no one. And the state purpose is 
legitimate and substantial. Generations of our finest 
minds, both among educators and students, have believed 
2. 
that single sex college level institutions afford 
distinctive benefits. Few thoughtful people have denied 
that even the choice to attend such an institution, where 
other options also are available, is not desirable and 
indeed commendable policy where a state can afford it. 
There are many persons, of course, who have different 
views. But simply because there are these differences is 
no reason - certainly none of constitutional dimension -
to conclude that no substantial state interest is served 
when such a choice is made available. 
lfp/ss 06/16/82 Rider A, Part IV (MUW) 
MUWIV SALLY-POW 
IV 
A distinctive feature of America's tradition has 
been respect for diversity. This has been characteristic 
of the peoples from numerous lands who have built our 
country. It is the essence of our democratic system in 
which opportunity for choices and diversity carefully are 
nurtured both by law and custom. What this case is "all 
about" for me is the preservation of a small segment of 
this diversity - this opportunity for choice - at the 
college level between single sex and coeducational 
institutions of higher learning. The Court answers that 
there is discrimination - not just that which may be 
tolerable but discrimination of constitutional dimension 
in the continuation of this single all women's college. 
But the Court finds it difficult to identify the victims 
of this perceived discrimination. It hardly can claim 
that women are discriminated against. A constitutional 
case has been made solely from the fact that one young 
man, concerned with serving his own personal convenience 
2. 
claims sex discrimination - not because he is denied the 
choice of an all male college or the opportunity to attend 
several coeducational institutions. He wants to have his 
own way: a college in his own home community. In my 
view, his claim is frivolous, and the Court's decision 
comes close to trivializing the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution. 
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The Court's opinion genuflects deeply to [the ideal ~( 
oiJ conformity. Left without honor--indeed held 
unconstitutional--is an element of diversity that has 
characterized much of American education and enriched much 
of American life. The Court holds today that no State now 
may provide even a single institution of higher learning 
open only to women students. It gives no heed to the 
efforts of the State of Mississippi to provide abundant 
opportunities for young men and young women to attend 
coeducational institutions, and none to the preferences of 
the more than 2,000 young women who have evidenced their 
approval of an all-women's college by choosing Mississippi 
University for Women (MUW) over seven coeducational 
universities within the State. The Court 
' · 
that the Equal Protection Clause makes it unlawful fo 
the State to provide women with a traditionally popular 
and respected choice of educational environment. It does 
2. 
so in a case instituted by one young man, who represents 
no class, and whose primary concern is personal 
convenience. 
It is undisputed that women enjoy complete equality 
of opportunity in Mississippi's public system of higher 
education. Of the State's eight universities and 16 
junior colleges, all except MUW are coeducational. At 
least two other Mississippi universities would have 
provided respondent with the nursing curriculum that he 
wishes to pursue. 1 No other male has joined in his 
complaint. The only groups to file amicus briefs are 
female students and alumni of MUW. And they have 
emphatically rejected respondent's arguments, urging that 
the State of Mississippi be allowed to continue offering 
the choice from which they have benefited. 
Nor is respondent significantly disadvantaged by 
MUW's all-female tradition. His constitutional complaint 
1 "[T]wo other Mississippi universities offered 
coeducational programs leading to a Bachelor of Science in 
Nursing the University of Southern Mississippi in 
Hattiesburg, 178 miles from Columbus; and the University 
of Mississippi in Jackson, 147 miles from Columbus . 
" Brief for Respondent 3. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. 
3. 
is based upon a single asserted harm: that he must travel 
to attend the state-supported nursing schools that 
concedely are available to him. The Court characterizes 
this injury as one of "inconvenience." Ante, at 5 n. 8. 
This description is fair and accurate, though somewhat 
embarrassed by the fact that there is, of course, no 
constitutional right to attend a State-supported 
university in one's home town. Thus the Court, to redress 
respondent's injury of inconvenience, must rest its 
invalidation of MUW' s single-sex program on a mode of 
"sexual stereotype" reasoning that has no application 
whatever to the respondent or to the "wrong" of which he 
complains. At best this is anomalous. And ultimately the 
anomoly reveals legal error--that of applying a~~~ ~ 
equal protection standard, developed in cases of genuine 
sexual stereotyping, to a narrowly utilized state 
classification that provides an additional choice for 
~I
women. What is ~o~e, I believe that Mississippi's 
1\ 
educational system should be upheld in this case even if 
this inappropriate method of analysis is applied~· 
I 
Coeducation, historically, is a novel educational 
theory. From grade school through high school, college, 
- -·-- - - - ------------ --- - - - -- - --- - ------ -·---- -- -·- ----· ---------------
4. 
and graduate and professional training, much of the 
nation's population during much of our history has been 
educated in sexually segregated classrooms. At the 
college level, for instance, until recently some of the 
most prestigious colleges and universities--including most 
of the Ivy League--had ~ histories of single-sex 
education. ~il4! Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbi<;i 
remained all~ colleges well into the second half of 
this century,A.the "Seven Sister" institutionf stablished a 
parallel standard of excellence for women's colleges. Of 
the Seven Sisters, Mount Holyoke opened as a female 
seminary in 1837 and was chartered as a college in 1888. 
Vassar was founded in 1865, Smith and Wells ley in 187 5, 
Radcliffe in 1879, Bryn Mawr in 1885, and Barnard in 1889. 
L. Baker, I'm Radcliffe! Fly Me! 2 (1976). Mount Holyoke, 
Smith, and Wellesley recently have made considered 
decisions to remain essentially single-sex institutions. 
See Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Opportunities 
for Women in Higher Education ("Carnegie Report"), as 
excerpted in B. Babcock, A. Freedman, E. Norton, & S. 
Ross, Sex Discrimination and the Law 1013, 1014 (1975). 
Barnard retains its independence from Columbia, its 
traditional coordinate institution. Harvard and Radcliffe 
5. 
maintained separate admissions policies as recently as 
1975. 2 
The sexual segregation of students has been a 
reflection of, rather than an imposition upon, the 
preference of those subject to the policy. It cannot be 
disputed, for example, that the highly qualified women 
attending the leading women's colleges could have earned 
admission to virtually any college of their choice. 3 
Women attending such colleges have chosen to be there, 
usually expressing a preference for the special benefits 
of single-sex institutions. Similar decisions were made by 
2The history, briefly summarized above, of single-
sex higher education in the Northeast is duplicated 1n 
other States. I mention only my State of Virginia, where 
even today Hollins College, Mary Baldwin College, Randolph 
Macon Woman's College, and Sweet Briar College remain all 
I 
women's. Each has a proud and respected reputation of 
quality education. 
3It is true that historically many institutions of 
higher education--particularly in the East and South--were 
single-sex. To these extents, choices were by no means 
universally available to all men and women. But choices 
always were substantial, and the purpose of relating the 
experience of our country with single-sex colleges and 
universities is to document what should be obvious: 
generations of Arner icans, including scholars, have 
thought--wholly without regard to any discriminatory 
animus--that there were distinct advantages in this type 
· of higher education. 
6. 
the colleges that elected to remain open to women only. 4 
The arguable benefits of single-sex colleges also 
continue to be recognized by students of higher education. 
The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education has reported 
that it "favor[s] the continuation of colleges for women. 
They provide an element of diversity and [an 
environment in which women] generally ... speak up more in 
their classes, ... hold more positions of leadership on 
campus, • . . and have more role models and mentors among 
women teachers and administrators." Carnegie Report, 
supra, quoted in K. Davidson, R. Ginsburg, & H. Kay, Sex-
Based Discrimination 814 (1975 ed.}. A 10-year empirical 
study by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program of 
4In announcing Wellesley's decision in 1973 to 
remain a women's college, President Barbara Newell said 
that "[t] he research we have clearly demonstrates that 
women's colleges produce a disproportionate number of 
women leaders and women in responsible positions in 
society; it does demonstrate that the higher proportion of 
women on the faculty the higher the motivation for women 
students." Carnegie Report, supra, in Babcock et al., Sex 
Discrimination and the Law, at 1014. Similarly reJecting 
coeducation in 1971, the Mount Holyoke Trustees ,Committee 
on Coeducation reported that "the conditions that 
historically justified the founding of women's colleges" 
continued to justify their remaining in that tradition. 
Ibid. 
7 0 
the American Counsel of Education and the University of 
California, Los Angeles also has affirmed the distinctive 
benefits of single-sex colleges and universities. As 
summarized in A. Astin, Four Critical Years 232 (1977), 
the data established that 
" [b] oth [male and female] single-sex colleges 
facilitate student involvement in several areas: 
academic, interaction with faculty, and verbal 
aggressiveness Men 1 s and women 1 s colleges 
also have a positive effect on intellectual 
self-esteem. Students at single-sex colleges 
are more satisfied than students at 
coeducational colleges with virtually all 
aspects of college life .•.. The only area wgere 
students are less satisfied is social life." 
5In this Court the benefits of single-sex education / 
have been asserted ~ by the students and alumnae 'I? 
of MUW. One would expect the Court to regard their views 
as directly relevant to this case: 
" [I] n the aspect of 1 i fe known as courtship or 
mate-pairing, the American female remains in the 
role of the pursued sex, expected to adorn and 
groom herself to attract the male. Without 
comment on the equities of this social 
arrangement, it remains a sociological fact. 
"An institution of collegiate higher 
learning maintained exclusively for women is 
uniquely able to provide the education 
atmosphere in which some, but not all, women can 
best attain maximum learning potential. I~ can 
serve to overcome the historic repression of the 
past and can orient a woman to function and 
achieve in the still male dominated economy. It 
can free its students of the burden of playing 
the mating game while attending classes, thus 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
Despite the express ions that single-sex 
institutions may offer advantages to their 
students, there is doubt that coeducational 
~ ~~~~~~~ 
i n s t i t u t ions ~,r;;.&; e-~u.m.QJ::.l-'~L.J..~ .... ,Jlli.J;2J~IP"~~~Qm-m..1i-R,-R..iWliolR~  • But the i r 
~t\ 
1\ predominance ~er:zi'Fdy does not establish--in any sense 
by a court ~--that 
preferences for single-sex education are misguided or 
individual properly cognizable 
illegitimate, or that a State may not provide its citizens 
with a choice. 6 
giving academic rather than sexual emphasis. 
Consequently, many such institutions florish and 
their graduates make significant contributions 
to the arts, profess ions and business." Brief 
for Mississippi University for Women Alumnae 
Assn. as Amicus Curiae 2-3. 
6
n [T]he Constitution does not require'· that a 
classification keep abreast of the latest in educational 
opinion, especially when there remains a respectable 
opinion to the contrary . • • . Any other rule would mean 
that courts and not legislatures would determine all 
matters of public policy." Williams v. NcNair, 316 F. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
II 
The issue in this case is whether a State 
transgresses the Constitution when--within the context of 
a public system that offers a diverse range of campuses, 
curricula, and educational alternatives--it seeks to 
accomodate the legitimate personal preferences of those 
desiring the advantages of an all - women's college. In my 
view, the Court errs seriously by assuming- - without 
argument or discussion--that the equal protection standard 
generally applicable to sex discrimination is appropriate 
here. That standard was ~to free women from 
"archaic and overbroad generalizations " 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 u.s. 498, 508 (1975). In no 
Supp. 134, 137 (DSC 1970), aff'd mem., 401 u.s. 951 (1971) 
(quotations and footnotes omitted). 
( 
~~~~ 10. 
~ b-~~ .t,Jl ~ 
~~ 
previous case have we applied it to invalidate state 
efforts to expand women's choices. Nor are there prior 
sex discrimination decisions by this Court in which a male 
plaintiff, as in this case, had the choice of an equal 
benefit. 
The cases cited by the Court 1\ ~u• c-eoPr9t be 
controlling of the issue now before us. In most of them 
women were given no opportunity for the same benefit as 
men. 7 Cases involving male plaintiffs are equally 
7see Kirshberg v. Feenstra, 450 u.s. 455, 456 
(1981) (invalidating statute "that gave husband, as 'head 
and master' of property jointly owned with his wife, the 
unilateral right to dispose of such property without his 
spouse's consent"); Wengler v. Dru~gists Mutual Ins. Co., 
446 u.s. 142, 147 (1980) (invalidatlng law under which the 
benefits "that the working woman can expect to be paid to 
her spouse in the case of her work-related death are less 
than those payable to the spouse of the deceased ~ale wage 
earner"); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 u.s. 7 (1975) 
(invalidating statute that provided a shorter period of 
parental support obligation for female child than for male 
children); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 u.s. 636, 643 
(1975) (invalidating statute that failed to grant a woman 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
inapplicable. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a 
male under 21 was not permi t~ed to buy beer anywhere in 
the State, 
~ 
and women were no choice as to whether they 
1\ 
would accept the "statistically measured but loose-fitting 
generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of 
aggregate groups." Id., at 209. A similar situation 
prevailed in Orr v. Orr, 440 u.s. 268, 279 (1979), where 
men had no opportunity to seek alimony from their divorced 
wives and women had no escape from the statute's 
stereotypical announcement of "the State's preference for 
an allocation of family responsibilities under which the 
worker "the same protection which a similarly situated 
male worker would have received"); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 u.s. 677, 683 (1973) (invalidating statute 
containing a "mandatory preference for male applicants"); 
Reed v. Reed, 404 u.s. 71, 74 (1971) (invalidating an 
"arbitrary preference established in favor of males" in 
the administration of decedent's estates). 
----------------------·---·-~--~~---=·----~-.. --~-
12 . 
wife plays a dependent role • .. 8 
By applying standard equal protection analysis to 
~~ 
this case, 9 the Court ~s- the l1berating purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause , wit:R aR a rei tr ar il:yo-
c)-restrietive aim. It forbids the States from providing 
8see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 u.s. 380 (1979} 
(invalidating law that both denied men the opportunity-- ~;- . ~ . 
given to women of blocking the adoption of ~~ 
illegitimate child by IRCaR-& e-E withholding ~
and that did not permit women to counter the statute's ;--
generalization that the maternal role is more important to 
women than the paternal role is to men} • 
9Even the Court does not argue that the appropriate 
standard here is "strict scrutiny"--a standard that none 
of our "sex discrimination" cases ever has adopted. 
Sexual segregation in education differs from the 
tradition, typified by the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 u.s. 537 (1896}, of "separate but equal" racial 
segregation. Because racial segregation was the product 
of discrimination against blacks, segregated 
facilities were offered, not as alternatives to increase 
the choices available to blacks, but as the sole 
alternative. MUW stands in sharp contrast. Of 
Mississippi's eight public universities and 16 public 
junior colleges, only MUW considers sex as a criterion for 
admission. Women consequently are free to select a 
coeducational education environment for themselves if they 
so desire; their attendance of MUW is not a matter of 
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ch9ose the type of university ~ women with an opportunity to 
that they prefer. And yet it is these women, whom the 
should be recalled, is not that he 
substantive educational opportunity, or even the right to 
attend an all-male or a coeducational college. It is only 
distances. 10 
10students in respondent's position, in "being 
denied the right to attend the State college in their home 
town, are treated no differently than are other students 
who res ide in communities many miles distant from any 
State supported college or university. The location of 
any such institution must necessarily inure to the benefit 
of some and and to the detriment of others, depending upon 
the distance the affected individuals reside from the 
institution." Heaton v. Bristol, 317 s.w. 2d 86, 99 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 u.s. 230 (1959), quoted 
in Williams v. NcNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 137 (DSC 1970), 
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/;1I . 
view this case as far removed 
s x discrimination cases on which the Court I 
would sustain Mississippi's right to continue MUW on a 
rational basis analysis. But I need not apply this 
"lowest tier" of scrutiny. I can accept for present 
~ 
purposes the standard applied by the Court: that~ 
.1\ 
~ 
A gender-based distinction must serve 
"" 
an important 
governmental objective by means that are substantially 
related to its achievement. ~-, Wengler v. Druggists 
Mutual Ins. Co., 446 u.s. 142, 150 (1980). The record in 
~ 
this reflects that MUW has a historic position in the 
A 
State's educational system dating back to 1884, and that 
many young women in Mississippi retain a preference for 
the choice that MUW provides. The choice is one that 
15. 
discriminates against no one . 1.1 A_nd the State's purpose 
in preserving that choice is legitimate and substantial. 
Generations of our finest minds, both among educators and 
students, have believed that single-sex, college-level 
institutions afford distinctive benefits. There are many 
persons, of course, who have different views. But simply 
because there are these differences is no reason--
certainly none of constitutional dimension--to conclude 
that no substantial state interest is served when such a 
choice is made available. 
11 "such a plan (i.e., giving the student a choice of 
a 'single-sex' and co-educational institutions) exalts 
neither sex at the expense of the other, but to the 
contrary recognizes the equal rights of both sexes to the 
benefit of the best, most varied system of higher 
education that the State can supply." Williams v~ NcNair, 
316 F. Supp. 134, 138 n. 15 (DSC 1970), aff'd mem., 401 
u.s. 951 (1971), quoting Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W. 2d 
86, 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 
(1959). 
16. 
In arguing to the contrary, the Court suggests that 
the MUW is so operated as to "perpetuate the stereotyped 
view of nursing as an exclusively women's job." Ante, at 
11. But as the Court itself acknowledges, id., at 2, 
MUW's School of Nursing was not created until 1971--about 
90 years after the single-sex campus itself was founded. 
This hardly supports a link between nursing as a woman's 
profession and MUW's single-sex admission policy. Indeed, 
MUW's School of Nursing was not instituted until more than 
a decade after a separate School of Nursing was 
established at the coeducational University of Mississippi 
at Jackson. See University of Mississippi, 1982 
Undergraduate Catalog 162. The School of Nursing makes up 
only one part--a relatively small part12--of MUW's diverse 
Footnote(s) 12 will appear on following pages. 
17. 
modern university campus and curriculum. The other 
departments on the MUW campus offer a typical range of 
degrees13 and a typical range of subjects. 14 There is no 
indication that woman suffer fewer opportunities at other 
Mississippi state campus because of MUW's admission 
policy. 15 
12For instance, the School of Nursing takes up 15 
pages of MUW's 234 page course catalog. See Mississippi 
University for Women, 81/82 Bulletin 185-200. 
13~, Bachelor of Arts; Bachelor of Science; 
Master ()~ Arts; Master of Science. See Mississippi 
University for Women, 81/82 Bulletin 40. 
special pre-professional programs in 
medecine, pharmacy, physical therapy, 
medecine. Id. 
MUW also offers 
law, dentistry, 
and veterinary 
14Muw's Bulletin on its Table of Content lists the 
following subjects (offered in its School of Arts and 
Sciences): Air Force ROTC; Art; Behavioral Sciences; 
Biological Sciences; Business and Economics; Cooperative 
Education; English and Foreign Languages; Health, Physical 
Education, Recreation, and Dance; History, Journalism and 
Broadcasting; Mathematics; Music; Physical Sciences; and 
Speech Communication. See Mississippi University for 
Women, 81/82 Bulletin 3. 
15For instance, the catalog for the coeducational 
University of Mississippi lists in its general description 
Footnote continued on next page. 
18. 
In sum, the practice of voluntarily chosen 
single-sex education is an honored tradition in our 
country, even if it now rarely exists in state colleges 
and universities. Mississippi's accomodation of such 
student choices is legitimate because it is completely 
consensual and is important because it permits students to 
decide for themselves the type of college education they 
think will benefit them most. Finally, Mississippi's 
policy is substantially related to its long-respected 
objective. 16 
the "Sarah Isom Center for Women's Studies," which is 
described as "dedicated to the development of cir r iculum 
and scholarship about women, the dissemination of 
information about their expanding carrier opportunities, 
and the establishment of mutual support networks for women 
of all ages and backgrounds." University of Mississippi, 
1982 Undergraduate Catalog 13-14. This listing preceeds 
information about the University's Law and Medical 
Centers. Id., at 14-15. 
Footnote(s) 16 will appear on following pages. 
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IV . 
A distinctive feature of America's tradition has 
been respect for diversity. This has been characteristic 
of the peoples from numerous lands who have built our 
country. It is the essence of our democratic system. At 
stake in this case as I see it is the preservation of a 
small aspect of this diversity. But that aspect is by no 
means insignificant, given our heritage of available 
16The Court argues that MUW' s means are not 
sufficiently related to its goal because it has allowed 
men to audit classes. The extent of record information is 
that men have audited 138 course in the last 10 years. 
Brief for Respondent 21. On average, then, men have 
audited 14 courses a year. MUW's current annual catalog 
lists 913 course. See Mississippi University for Women, 
81/82 Bulletin passim. 
It is understandable that MUW might believe that 
it could allow men to audit courses without materially 
affecting its environment. MUW charges tuition but gives 
no academic credit for auditing. The University 'evidently 
is correct in believing that few men will choose to audit 
under such circumstances. This deviation from a per feet 
relationship between means and ends is insubstantial. 
20. 
choice between single-sex and coeducational institutions 
of higher learning. The Court answers that there is 
discrimination--not just that which may be tolerable, as 
for example between those candidates able to contribute 
most to an institution and those able to contribute less--
but discrimination of constitutional dimension. But, 
having found "discrimination," the Court finds it 
difficult to identify the victims. It hardly can claim 
..!H3 
that women are discriminated against. A constitutional 
~~Lj-..J-t> ~~~ ~AU...,e.-
case ha.s iu:i~n ra9Jel¥ frgfft ~e -:ancerns .-rf one young man,.._ ~ 
1\ A ;--
~ ''he ..l:lae found it inconvenient to travel to any of the 
~ 
1\ institutions made available to him by the State of 
Mississippi. I.n Q.S.Sen~fle iAsi ~ haS"~ 1~ht ~ ;;-~f-
Equal Protection Clause does not support this 
... 
claim, nor can it be made to do so 
trivialized. I dissent, ~ 
21. 
4;5Jj UP 
withou~isk of being 
